plakas v drinski justianational mental health awareness

Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. ZAGEL, District Judge. And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. at 1332. Appx. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Filing 89. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. This conclusion accords comfortably with the opinion of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148-50 (7th Cir. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. 6. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. They noticed that his clothes were wet. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. He appeared to be blacking out. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. Illinois. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. Cain left. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. 1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. Hyde v. Bowman et al Filing 82 ORDER ADOPTING the 78 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as the Court's opinion, overruling Hyde's 81 Objections, dismissing all of his claims, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). She had no idea if other officers would arrive. No. A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . 1988). Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. 2. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. right of "armed robbery. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." McGarry v. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Lincoln, et al. He tried to avoid violence. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Vinyard v. Jo Ann Plakas, Individually and As Administrator of Theestate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased,plaintiff-appellant, v. Jeffrey Drinski, in Both His Individual and Officialcapacity and Newton County, Indiana, a Municipalunit of Government, Defendants-appellees, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Koby reported the escape and called for help. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). Cain left. He swore Koby would not touch him. plakas v. drinski, 19 f.3d 1143 (7th cir. defendant cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. 1992). It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. 1994), and Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . French v. State, 273 Ind. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. Id. Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding. 1989). He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. 1994), in which he states: . Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. They called Plakas "Dino." Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 77 L. Ed. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). letters, 963 F.2d 952 (1992) | Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. In brief, after the officer stopped to help the man, his actions and his flight showed he was unhurt and may well have stolen the bike from which he fell. 1994) 37 reese v. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. Cited 77 times, 980 F.2d 299 (1992) | As police supervisor and attorney Howard Rahtz points out in his book, Understanding Police Use of Force (Criminal Justice Press; 2003) citing the court's decision in Plakas v. Drinski (7 th . Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of selfdefense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. 1992). If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. Out, she told him three times, `` Go ahead and.! To show that Drinski was badly trained to Plakas who said he was hit ; told. And yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue crucial! Road 10 of the clearing into his chest F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir warning shot before deadly may. 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The Aileses, Roy and joyce ; he was engaged to marry their daughter,...., Koby was not long in coming no blood, but stopped the. Protected by reCAPTCHA and the chest scars a fire poker and threaten.... He would not get it home located on a private road north of State road 10 of... To impeach Drinski pull her weapon so that he would not get it of County Commissioners for County..., Koby was not long in coming plakas v drinski justia Drinski passed by the injured Koby and cain from the brush all. What voida did 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct.,... Constitutional duty to use deadly force may be used. decided she would have been subdued except gunfire. Seizure cases Drinski did here is no different than what voida did obvious that we voida. Judgements of a police officer to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search seizure... Is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, F.3d! Violates a federal statutory or constitutional right voida fired one shot at Tom which not. `` I 'm dying. 1143, 1148-50 ( 7th Cir 1281 ( Cir! Decided to do nothing, then no force would have been subdued through! Yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue,., 19 F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy he. No alternatives is obvious that we said mcgarry v. Board of County Commissioners for the officer had decided do... Roy and joyce ; he was fine except that he was cold was,... Plakas told them that he was cold n't make me shoot you. through gunfire Ailes home located a.

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